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1 Introduction
Young Europeans struggle to nd jobs, are over-represented in temporary employment and leave the
parental home remarkably late. It is consensual to blame labor and housing market institutions as being
responsible for these outcomes. The housing market regulation (HMR) has been accused of reducing the
rental market size, thereby contributing to hamper worker mobility. Employment protection legislation
(EPL) is viewed as detrimental to labor market entrants by depleting the supply of vacancies and closing
access to long-term jobs. However, the actual role played by each set of institutions is still under debate.
Moreover, the support for labor market reforms is very tenuous. At best, the youth do not seem interested
in such reforms; at worst they demonstrate against them as in 2006 and 2016 in France.
Distrust vis-à-vis pro-market reforms may be rooted in the cultural or legal traits of Continental
European countries.1 In this paper, we argue that the youth distaste for reforms of job protection can
also be rational in a context where the rental market is heavily regulated. The key idea is as follows:
HMR generates a social demand for job protection as a second-best technology to signal workersability
to pay the rent. When the rental market is very regulated, landlords need to screen applicants on the
basis of the expected risk of rent default. In this goal, landlords use labor market signals to gure out the
individual risk of dismissal. When permanent jobs are not protected, selection in long-term employment
is low and the mean risk of dismissal is large. Thus landlords are relunctant to rent their dwellings.
Protecting jobs forces rms to be more selective so that the quality of the signal vehicled by labor market
contracts increases.
We proceed in two steps. Section 2 presents a set of facts motivating our analysis. We use aggregate
and micro data from the European Community Household Panel. The country-specic time-varying sets
of regulation are due to Kahn (2007) for EPL and Djankov et al (2003) for HMR. In the cross-section
of OECD countries, HMR is negatively correlated with youth employment and emancipation, the share
of young employees in short-term contracts is positively correlated with EPL; lastly HMR and EPL are
positively correlated.
At micro level, we explain individual employment, access to long-term contracts, emancipation and
access to rentals with individual xed e¤ects, country-specic time-varying characteristics and the indices
of EPL and HMR. HMR is negatively associated with emancipation and access to rentals but seems
uncorrelated with employment, whereas reforms of permanent contracts are strongly negatively correlated
with employment and access to long-term jobs, whereas the correlation is weaker with emancipation and
access to rentals.
Section 3 o¤ers a model of the housing and labor markets for young workers predicting these corre-
lations at aggregate level and consistent with the e¤ects at micro level. In this model, job protection
reduces the odds of employment, increases the share of employees in short-term contracts and does not
a¤ect the individual risk of dismissal. Still, nonemployed (young) workers can be in favor of job protection
and the social demand for job protection increases with HMR.
1Botero et al (2004) put forward the role of the legal origins of the judicial system, French origins being more prone
to regulating markets. Algan and Cahuc (2006) highlight machismo and the dominant religion. Algan and Cahuc (2009)
examine the role of civic attitudes. Alesina et al (2015) focus on family values.
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Firms o¤er short-term and long-term contracts, whereas landlords select applicants. Firms and land-
lords are confronted to a similar problem: assessing the ability of applicants to perform the job tasks or
pay the rent. However, employers play rst. By o¤ering a long-term job instead of a short-term one, rms
provide a signal to landlords. The value of this signal increases with the protection of long-term contracts.
In countries where the rental market is not very regulated, landlords do not need to screen applicants
who can easily be evicted in case of rent default. It follows that the social demand for job protection is
low. The opposite situation prevails in countries where the rental market is heavily regulated. There the
social demand for EPL is large.
Using job protection as a screening technology is a second-best response to landlordsinformational
problem. This technology makes sense because the risk of rent default is positively correlated with the
risk of dismissal. There is evidence showing that households are more likely to default on the rent or on
the mortage reimbursement when unemployed (see, e.g., Eichholtz, 1995, Deng et al, 1996, Serrano-Diaz,
2005, Nivière, 2006, Gerardi et al, 2015). Meanwhile regular jobs last much longer on average than
short-term jobs. In the case of youth, labor contracts are the only exploitable signals for landlords. For
instance, there is no clean history of rent payments and landlord cannot contact previous landlords to
know the applicants better.
This paper calls for reforms of the housing market to reduce the social demand for EPL. This is only
after such reforms have been made that job protection can be reduced. Decreuse and van Ypersele (2011)
make a complementary point. In their model, job protection reduces the individual risk of dismissal and
individuals contract loans with lenders to buy housing units. The equilibrium price of loans decreases
with job protection. Therefore nonemployed persons are inclined to set the legislation above the threshold
maximizing employment. Our paper shares the view that job security is highly valued when the housing
market is regulated. However, the economic mechanism di¤ers: job protection does not reduce the chance
of losing ones job; instead it reveals the individual risk. The labor market block of our model borrows
from Pries and Rogerson (2005) and Cahuc et al (2016) where each match is associated to a specic risk
of dissolution. Selection into labor contracts generates composition e¤ects responsible for the decreasing
relationship between job protection and job loss probability. In an extension of our model, we account
for these two complementary views of job destruction and job protection. They strengthen each other
and contribute to increasing the demand for job protection.
The paper is complementary to the literature on the links between the housing and labor markets. This
literature makes the general claim that factors limiting worker mobility have side e¤ects on employment.
For instance the Oswald hypothesis posits that unemployment increases with housing ownership because
owners are less mobile than renters and cannot easily respond to income or employment shocks by moving
to an alternative location. Closer to us Rupert and Wasmer (2012) argue that labor market institutions
such as EPL or unemployment compensation have strong e¤ects on unemployment in countries where
the rental market is very regulated. In our basic model, HMR does not directly a¤ect employment but
decreases it through its impact on the demand for job protection. In an extension, we focus on an
extreme situation where occupying a job always involves moving to a new dwelling. Despite rms take
into account the e¤ect of the labor contract on the rental probability, selection into employment is too
low. Protecting LT jobs make rms more selective, which may improve employment and emancipation.
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The paper relates to the literature on the positive analysis of job protection. In their analysis of
the regulation of labor, Botero et al (2004) distinguish market failure correction and rent-seeking argu-
ments. Our paper belongs to the former strand of arguments. Most models of job protection feature a
potentially nonmonotonic relationship between employment and the strictness of job protection. Having
zero protection is an option, but cases where the employment-maximizer level of protection is strictly
positive cannot be excluded. This optimal level of protection then depends on the nature of labor market
distortions (see Blanchard and Tirole, 2008, for a complete discussion involving EPL and unemployment
insurance). In our approach, job protection is used to correct a lemon issue in the housing market. Fixing
this problem destroys jobs, but the level of job protection maximizes some sort of social welfare function.
According to the rent-seeking argument, job protection benets the majority of insiders who already
hold regular jobs and is detrimental to outsiders (see, e.g., Saint-Paul, 2001). This literature makes
important points but does not help us to understand the wide support for job protection that goes well
above the set of installed workers. Our model abstracts from such insiders because already established
workers who have found a dwelling do not derive additional benets from job protection. In an extension,
we show two groups of workers prefer strongly protected jobs: individuals with a large probability of
success and those with a low probability of success. The former want to belong to a small elite club with
large access to the housing market, whereas the latter want to be accompanied in short-term contracts
by as many workers as possible to avoid stigmatization.
The consideration of alternative risks and market situations may also contribute to explaining the
social demand for job protection as a screening technology. These risks must be correlated with the
probability of being successful in an ongoing relationship, and the market situations must involve a
screening phase taking place after the labor contract has been attributed. In a nal extension to the
basic model, we discuss such risks and markets, like the risk of damage to the dwelling due to the
tenants behavior, the risk of mortgage default for lenders, or the risk of marriage dissolution. In each
case the strength of regulation motivates screening and the induced demand for protected jobs.
2 Motivating facts
This section presents two sets of facts. We rst describe a nexus of aggregate correlations in the cross-
section of OECD countries between an index of housing market regulation (HMR), an index of Em-
ployment Protection Legislation (EPL), youth employment, youth emancipation, and youth share of
employees in short-term jobs. We then turn to micro evidence with the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP) and measure the e¤ects of HMR and EPL on the individual probability of employment,
access to long-term jobs, emancipation and access to rentals.
2.1 Aggregate evidence
At aggregate level, youth employment and emancipation are negatively correlated with HMR, the share
of employed youth in temporary employment is positively correlated with EPL on regular contracts and
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HMR and EPL are positively correlated.
Figure 1 confronts the youth employment rate to a measure of HMR. The computation of the youth
employment rate is the ratio of employees to total population among the 16-35 in ECHP over the period
1994-2001. The measure of HMR is the index of procedural formalism built by Djankov et al (2003).
In the 2003 paper, the index was only available for a year. Balas et al (2009) extend the coverage and
the index is available on a yearly basis between 1950 and 2000 for fourty developed and developing
countries. They focus on the eviction of a tenant who does not pay the rent. The index is built from
several sub-indices that describe the exact procedure used by litigants and courts: the required degree
of professionalism of lawyers and judges, the preeminence of written versus oral presentation at each
stage of the procedure, the need for legal justication in the complaint and in the judgment, the rules of
evidence, the appeal procedure, engagement formalities that must be observed before a party is legally
bound by the court proceedings, and the number of independent procedural actions.
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Figure 1: Youth employment and HMR in Europe. Youth
employment is the ratio of employees to total population among the
16-35 in ECHP over the period 1994-2001. HMR is the degree of
procedural formalism due to Balas et al (2009). The variable has been
averaged over seven years and centered around its period mean.
Figure 1, though based on a small number of countries, suggests that the employment rate is negatively
correlated with the HMR index. Young workers struggle to nd jobs in countries where the rental market is
very regulated. The relationship linking the two variables implies the raw elasticity of youth employment
with repect to the HMR index is slightly lower than one.
Figure 2 depicts the proportion of emancipated youth against the HMR index. The youth emanci-
pation rate measures the percentage of individual, aged between 16-35 years in ECHP, who do not live
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with parents. The OLS line is strictly decreasing, suggesting that young persons living in countries where
the rental market is very regulated quit the family home very late. Quantitatively, the raw elasticity of
youth emancipation to HMR is unitary.
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Figure 2: Youth emancipation and HMR in Europe. The youth
emancipation rate measures the percentage of individual, aged between
16-35 years in ECHP, who do not live with parents. HMR is the degree of
procedural formalism due to Balas et al (2009). The variable has been
averaged over seven years and centered around its period mean.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of young employees in a temporary job over total youth employment
against the OECD strictness index of EPL on regular employment. The share of 15-24 employees in a
temporary job are given by OECD. The Figure 3 displays a positive correlation: young workers are more
likely in short-term jobs in countries that strongly protect long-term jobs.
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Figure 3: Share of young employees in temporary employment vs EPL on
regular jobs in OECD countries, 1994-2001. The share of young employees is
computed from OECD data and averaged over seven years. The EPL variable
has been averaged over seven years and centered around its period mean.
Figure 4 is taken from Decreuse and van Ypersele (2011). It plots an index of EPL strictness due
to Allard (2005) against the HMR index for OECD countries. The two variables are strongly positively
correlated. Decreuse and van Ypersele show this correlation is robust to the consideration of country
xed e¤ects.
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Figure 4: The relationship between HMR and EPL, 1995-2000. The two
variables have been averaged over ve years and centered around their period
means. Source: Decreuse and van Ypersele (2011).
2.2 Micro evidence
To go beyond the partial correlations reported above, we turn to micro data and follow Kahn (2010)
who evaluates the impacts of labor contract reforms on employment with the ECHP. This allows us to
check which correlation is robust to the consideration of country xed e¤ects and to the consideration of
regulations in alternative markets. The identication strategy exploits the heterogenous timing of reforms
in Europe during the 1990s. The ECHP follows di¤erent households over one to eight years between 1994
and 2001. As individuals are observed several times, we can account for all time-invariant characteristics
by including individual xed e¤ects. Given the country of residence belongs to such characteristics,
individual xed e¤ects also contain country-specic cultural biases.
Kahn shows that reforms facilitating temporary contracts do not a¤ect employment and increase the
probability of having a temporary contract conditional on employment. By contrast, reforms of permanent
contracts have stronger e¤ects on employment. These results are robust to a number of control variables
but do not resist the introduction of country-specic trends. Having this limit in mind, we adapt Kahns
approach to (i) the simultaneous consideration of EPL and HMR reforms and (ii) the modelling of both
employment and emancipation.
Kahn registers changes in country-specic laws a¤ecting dismissals for regular jobs and the use of
temporary employment. He builds two reform variables, one for long-term (LT) contracts and the other
one for short-term (ST) jobs. In both cases, the variable starts from 0 and does not change in the
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absence of reform, one is substracted when the reform implies stricter protection, and one is added when
the reform softens protection. There are fourteen episodes of reforms, with eight liberalizing the use of
temporary employment, one restricting it, three reducing protection for LT jobs, and two increasing it.
We complete the dataset by including the HMR index. The remaining sample includes Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK2 . There is substantial heterogeneity
between countries. However, the index does not vary much within countries. Most of identication relies
on four main changes that occured in three countries: France, Italy and the UK. There also more minor
changes, for a total of 11 episods of modications.
Kahn considers all individuals in the ECHP as well as a subsample of young workers below 25. We
focus on a slightly di¤erent group of workers, the 16-35 population who exited the schooling system. The
choice of the age span is suggested by the data: the mean age of emancipation varies across countries and
reaches 31 in Italy. The share of emancipated individuals stabilizes at 35, which justies our choice. We
exclude individuals who are in education for endogeneity concerns. As this choice is arbirary, we report
in the Appendix estimates for di¤erent samples: all young individuals including people in education, and
di¤erent age groups. The results are qualitatively similar.
For individual i as of year t, the employment probability and the individual probability of being in a
LT contract conditional on employment are
empit = i + t + x
0
it + LT reform
LT
j(i)t + ST reform
ST
j(i)t + HMRHMRj(i)t + "it; (1)
ltcit = ai + bt + x0itc+ dLT reform
LT
j(i)t + dST reform
ST
j(i)t + dHMRHMRj(i)t + eit; (2)
where emp= 1 when the individual is employed and 0 otherwise and ltc= 1 when the individual is in a
LT job and 0 when in a ST job. Parameters i and ai are individual xed e¤ects, t and bt are time
dummies common to all individuals, xit is a vector of individual characteristics and possibly time-varying
characteristics, and the three reform variables have been described previously. Lastly, we consider the
contemporaneous impact of the HMR index but also its delayed e¤ect by including the 3-year lagged
index. The di¤erences with Kahn are the consideration of HMR and the 16-35 population excluding
individuals in education.
In the spirit of the employment and contract type equations, we also model the individual probability
of emancipation (ema) and the individual probability of renting (rent) conditional on being emancipated:
emait = i + t + x
0
it + LT reform
LT
j(i)t + ST reform
ST
j(i)t + HMRHMRj(i)t + "it; (3)
rentit = ai + bt + x0itc+ dLT reform
LT
j(i)t + dST reform
ST
j(i)t + dHMRHMRj(i)t + eit: (4)
The emancipation regression is a reduced form. It does not take into account individual income or
labor contract though these variables certainly a¤ect the access to the housing market and vary over
time. However, they are likely endogenous. For instance, rms may o¤er LT contracts to facilitate access
to rentals (we develop this argument in section 3.2). Therefore these variables are replaced by their
determinants.
2There are other countries in the ECHP, i.e., Austria, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden, but one of
the two reform variables or the HMR index are not available for such countries.
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a b c d
dependent variable emp ltc ema rent
reformLT 0.0659 0.0950 0.0207 0.0052
(5.62) (7.42) (3.78) (0.62)
reformST 0.0061 -0.0136 -0.0043 -0.0042
(1.02) (-1.78) (-1.12) (-0.39)
HMRt -0.0067 0.0092 -0.0437 -0.1250
(-0.27) (0.29) (-3.6) (-4.67)
HMRt 3 0.0487 -0.0271 -0.1626 -0.4022
(0.89) (-0.30) (-6.44) (-4.08)
within R2 0.0188 0.0427 0.0847 0.048
N 175,387 87,067 175,487 120,100
Table 1: The impacts of EPL and HMR on youth employment, access to LT jobs, emancipation and
access to rentals. Signicance thresholds: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The t statistics are between
parentheses. The variable reformLT increases when the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals
or groups of workers in long-term contracts are softened. The reformST variable increases when the procedures
involved in hiring workers on xed-term or temporary work agency contracts become less constraining. All
regressions include individual xed e¤ects, time e¤ects / age, and time-varying individual-specic controls (a
dummy equal to one when the individual is 16-25, another dummy equal to one when the individual is a woman
and aged 16-25, and the interaction of the latter variable with a country-specic dummy). Each observation is
weighted using the ECHP sampling weights. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level.
Table 1 shows the results. Column a shows that the typical reform of permanent contracts increases
the employment probability by 7 percentage points, whereas column b shows that it raises the share of LT
contracts in overall employment by 10 points. By contrast, reforms of temporary contracts have smaller
e¤ects on employment, and tend to increase the share of ST contracts in overall youth employment.
Changes in contemporaneous or lagged HMR have no impacts on youth employment outcomes: neither
the employment probability nor the access to LT contracts seem a¤ected by HMR.
Columns c and d highlight the spectacuar negative impacts of HMR on emancipation and access to
the rental market. This impact is more pronounced for the lagged regressor than for the contemporaneous
one. Decreasing the French mean value of the index over the sample to the UK one would be associated
to an increase in emancipation by 15 percentage points. Of course, such a shock is enormous and unseen
at country level during the sample period. Meanwhile, labor contract reforms are weakly associated to
these variables, if any. Reforms of ST contracts are never statistically signicant, whereas reforms of LT
contracts only have a positive and signicant impact on emancipation.
Our results can be summarized as follows. When we account for individual xed e¤ects, reforms of LT
contracts are strongly positively associated with youth employment and LT employment, whereas they are
much less correlated with youth emancipation. Meanwhile, HMR is strongly negatively correlated with
youth emancipation and access to rentals, whereas it is uncorrelated with youth employment. Table A1 in
the Appendix shows these results qualitatively hold when the youth population accounts for individuals in
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education, though HMR seems more negatively correlated with youth employment. The panel of Figures
A2 to A7 displays the di¤erent estimated parameters and their 95% condence intervals for di¤erent
age groups (Figures A2 to A5), and when individuals in education are included in the sample (Figures
A6 and A7). We progressively increase the lowest age or decrease the largest age dening the youth
population. These gures do not alter the general ndings reported here. However they suggest there is
additional heterogeneity between age groups of young individuals. Lastly, like Kahn (2010), the results
are not robust to country-specic trends. This result is not surprising given the small numbers of years
and reform episods. However, it forbids a causal interpretation of the di¤erent parameters.
The purpose of the rest of the paper is to make sense of such aggregate correlations and micro-
based facts. In the next section we present a model where job protection can be seen as a second-best
technology transmitting labor market signals to landlords who face a lemon problem. The value of such
signals increases with the rental market regulation, which explains why the society has strong preference
for job protection despite its side e¤ects on ST employment and overall youth employment.
3 Theory
We develop a model of the labor and housing markets for young workers. This model features a social
demand for job protection based on the extent of procedural formalism a¤ecting judicial disputes in the
rental market. We rst expose the basic model and then turn to various extensions.
3.1 Basic model
We consider a static economy peopled by identical individuals. All individuals start unemployed and live
with their parents. The model has two blocks. In the labor market block, workers and rms meet and the
worker-rm pair receives an initial signal on the match quality. The worker is then hired in a short-term
or long-term contract based on this signal and on the stringency of EPL. In the housing market, landlords
observe workerscontracts and screen them on the basis of expected job security. Then the match quality
is revealed and the worker stays in the job or goes back to unemployment. In case of job loss, tenants
default on the rent and landlords incur a loss due to the length of litigation and eviction procedures. The
proportion that is lost is exogenous, and measures the degree of HMR.
We proceed in four steps. We rst specify the model agenda and then successively present the labor
market and rental market blocks. After discussing the comparative statics properties of equilibrium, we
nally turn to the study of preferred job protection.
Timing. In a rst stage, individuals search for jobs. Firms choose whether they o¤er a long-term
contract (LT) or a short-term one (ST). In a second stage, workers search for a dwelling and landlords
screen them according to their contract type. In a third stage, match quality is revealed, and some jobs
turn nonprotable. Only those who stay employed pay the rent and enjoy housing consumption.
To simplify, wages and rents are exogenous. This assumption can be justied as representing additional
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rigidities at work in the housing and labor markets. More interestingly, it abstracts from any second-order
e¤ect of job protection on prices, so that the social demand for EPL, if any, cannot be attributed to such
disputable e¤ects. For instance, Leonardi and Pica (2013) exploit the 1990 Italian reform that introduced
unjust dismissal costs for rms below 15 employees. They nd that the slight average wage reduction
induced by the reform hides highly heterogenous e¤ects. In a similar spirit, Casas-Arce and Saiz (2010)
argue that procedural formalism in the rental market has heterogenous e¤ects on rents by redistributing
income from movers to stayers.
Labor market. There is a continuum of rms. Each rm corresponds to a single job slot, which can
be active or inactive. Turning active costs c > 0. Vacant jobs and unemployed workers meet according
to a matching technology. Let  be the ratio of vacant jobs to unemployed workers. The probability
of meeting a rm is m (), whereas the probability of contacting a worker is m () =, with m () = 0,
m (1) = 1, m0 > 0, m00 < 0, and m0(0) = 1. The strict concavity implies that m () =  is strictly
decreasing, while the Inada-type condition ensures that lim lim
!0
m () =  = 1 by lHôpitals rule.
Right after meeting, the rm-worker pair receives a signal on match quality. The match is good with
probability P and bad with complementary probability 1 P . The probability P is uniformly distributed
on [0; 1]. Firms make two decisions: whether to hire the worker or not, and, conditional on hiring, which
contract they o¤er. The contract type is indexed by i = ST;LT . Contracts di¤er in two ways: on the one
hand, they are associated to di¤erent costs of dismissal. The ring cost ti > 0 is a pure loss to the pair
and tLT = t  tST = 0. On the other hand, contracts di¤er in training opportunity: only the workers
hired in a LT contract can receive training. Workers in a bad match are dismissed in all circumstances,
while workers in a good match produce yL when untrained, and yH > yL when trained. We assume
the following parametric restrictions hold: yH   w > yL   w > 0 and w > 1. Moreover, we denote
y  yH   yL the output di¤erential between good and bad matches.
The trade-o¤ is the following: a LT contract is more costly than a ST contract because the rm has
to pay a cost in case of separation. However, o¤ering a LT contract is advantageous because trained
workers can be more productive. This advantage can be exploited when the match is good. Thus the
value of o¤ering a LT contract increases with the signal on match quality.
The assumption whereby LT jobs are more productive than ST ones ensures rms have incentive to
o¤er LT jobs. Note, however, that workers in temporary jobs are less likely to receive training (see,
e.g., Booth et al, 2002). More generally costly commitment favors match-specic investments, which this
assumption broadly captures.
Let LT and ST denote the prots associated with a LT and a ST contracts. We have
LT = P (yH   w) + (1  P ) (0  t); (5)
ST = P (yL   w): (6)
The worker obtains a LT contract when
P  PLT = t
y + t
;
and a ST contract when
PLT > P  0: (7)
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Figure 5 represents the choice made by the rm as a function of the initial belief P on match quality.
This belief is on the horizontal axis, whereas the expected prot lies on the vertical axis. The expected
prot associated to a ST contract starts from 0 when the job is surely of low quality and the worker is
red with certainty. Then it increases to yL   w when P = 1. The expected prot associated to a LT
contract starts negative because t  0. Then it crosses the horizontal line for some P , crosses ST in
PLT and reaches yH   w when P = 1. Thus the rm gives a ST contract when P 2 [0; PLT ) and a LT
contract when P  PLT . When t = 0, PLT = 0 and all workers are hired in a LT contract; when t is
arbitrarily large, PLT tends to 1 and all workers are hired in a ST contract.
Figure 5: Contract choice and belief on match quality
The number of active jobs responds to a free-entry condition. This implies that
c =
m ()

Z 1
0
maxfLT ; ST ; 0gdP: (8)
Accounting for the two belief thresholds detailed above, we have
c =
m ()

(Z PLT
0
ST dP +
Z 1
PLT
LT dP
)
(9)
=
m ()


y
1  PLT
2
+ (yL   w)1
2

:
13
Rental market. Once they have a job o¤er, which happens with probability m(), all workers search
for a dwelling. We consider the simple case where each worker meets one and only one landlord. The
expected income derived from renting to a type-i tenant is (1  i) + (1 )i = 1 i, where the rent
is normalized to unity, i is the expected default probability and 1  2 [0; 1] is the value of the dwelling
with a defaulting tenant. Parameter  is a measure of HMR. Procedural formalism weakens property
rights and landlords cannot recoup the full value of the dwelling in case of rent default. When  = 0, the
expected income of the landlord is equal to one and does not depend on the default probability.
To screen applicants, landlords observe the employment contract. The contract type reveals an average
match quality on the labor market which is (1 + PLT ) =2 for LT contract and PLT =2 for ST contract.
The corresponding default probabilities LT and ST are:
LT = E[1  P j P  PLT ] = 1  1 + PLT
2
; (10)
ST = E[1  P j P < PLT ] = 1  PLT
2
: (11)
These default probabilities are such that 1=2  LT < ST  1.
Each landlord has an opportunity cost of renting k, which is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function H. Landlords compare this opportunity cost to the expected income derived from
renting 1   i 2 [1=2; 1]. Therefore we suppose that the support of the cdf H is [1=2; 1]. Moreover,
this function has a continuous density h  H 0. Landlords expect that workers in ST jobs are more likely
to be dismissed and, therefore, to default on the rent. Importantly, the reason is not that LT contracts
protect workers against the risk of dismissal. Instead, the contract type reveals the match-specic risk of
dissolution.
The probability i of obtaining a rental varies with the contract type i = ST;LT . Indeed, we
have i = H (1  i). The probability decreases with the parameter of regulation  and the default
probability i. As LT < ST , we have LT > ST when  > 0 and workers with a LT contract are more
likely to nd a dwelling than workers with a ST contract.
Comparative statics. We now discuss the impacts of the di¤erent regulation parameters on model
outcomes. In this goal, let eLT = m(
) Pr[P  PLT ]E[P j P  PLT ] be LT employment, eST =
m() Pr[P < PLT ]E[P j P < PLT ] be ST employment and e = eST + eLT be overall employment.
Similarly, the fraction of emancipated workers is q = eSTST + eLTLT .
Taking into account the values of LT , ST , LT and ST , we have
eLT = m(
)
1  P 2LT
2
;
eST = m(
)
P 2LT
2
;
e =
m()
2
:
The meeting probability m() strictly decreases with t. An increase in the dismissal cost is equivalent
to an increase in expected labor costs. Job protability decreases and rms create fewer vacancies as a
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result. The dismissal cost a¤ects the threshold belief on match quality as follows:
dPLT
dt
=
yH   yL
(yH + t  yL)2
> 0:
When the cost of dismisall t increases, rms substitute ST jobs to LT ones. Therefore the threshold PLT
goes up.
It follows that deLT =dt < 0, whereas deST =dt has an ambiguous sign. LT employment necessarily
decreases because the contact probability m() goes down and rms become relunctant to o¤er LT
contracts. The impact on ST employment is less clear-cut because rms have stronger incentive to hire
workers in a ST contract. As e = m()=2, overall employment decreases with t.
As for the emancipation probability q, we have
q = m () [(1  PLT ) (1  LT )LT + PLT (1  ST )ST ]
=
m()
2
[
 
1  P 2LT

H (1  =2 + PLT =2) + P 2LTH (1  + PLT =2)]: (12)
Emancipation results from the conjonction of three events: nding a job, keeping the job and nding
a rental. HMR has a negative impact on emancipation. The second line separates the emancipation
probability into two components: the employment probability e = m()=2 and the average probability
   1  P 2LT H (1  =2 + PLT =2) +P 2LTH (1  + PLT =2) of obtaining a lease. Whether the indi-
vidual has a LT or a ST contract,  reduces the likelihood that the landlord selects any worker. Therefore
both probabilities LT and ST decrease with parameter  and so  decreases with .
Optimal job protection.We now argue there may be positive demand for protected jobs despite
employment and the share of ST jobs increase with the ring cost t. We suppose that consumption and
emancipation are complementary goods. In this model capital owners receive a constant return. Moreover
landlordsand workerswell-beings are perfectly aligned. Therefore, the cost of dismissal maximizes the
expected utility of a typical worker before the signal P is known, i.e., under the veil of ignorance. Therefore
the optimal job protection parameter solves
t 2 arg max
t0
fq(w   1) = e(t)(t; )(w   1)g : ()
As w   1 does not depend on t, solving () is equivalent to maximizing the emancipation probability.
Employment decreases with t. Thus t = 0 is the employment-maximizer level of job protection and
emax is the corresponding employment level. In the absence of rental market regulation, i.e.,  = 0,
the optimal dismissal cost is t = 0. To see this, let us write the emancipation probability as follows:
q = eST + eLT (LT   ST ). When  = 0, landlords are as likely to rent to workers in ST and LT
contracts, i.e., LT = ST = H(1) = 1. Maximizing the emancipation probability is then equivalent to
maximizing employment.
When  > 0, landlords must take into account the default probability because they lose part of
the dwellings value in case of default. Suppose t = 0, then all workers are hired in a LT contract. It
follows that the emancipation probability is q = emaxH(1   =2). As  increases, the probability of
being accepted by the landlord goes down, reaching its minimum when  = 1. In this latter case, the
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probability is H(1=2) = 0. The unconditional mean of the default probability is too low for landlords
who su¤er the risk of losing their dwelling in case of default. Therefore they do not rent and the rental
market collapses.
Setting t > 0 is optimal when  = 1. This leads rms to select a subset of workers in LT contracts.
The belief threshold PLT is strictly positive and the mean default probability LT among such workers
is larger than 1/2. It follows that there is a mass of landlords who are willing to rent their dwellings to
workers in LT contracts. Meanwhile, all workers in ST contracts are forced to coreside with parents.
By continuity, the optimal cost of dismissal for LT jobs is strictly positive when  is su¢ ciently
large. In an interior solution to problem (), the optimal cost of dismissal solves the following rst-order
condition
e0(t)
e(t)
+
t(t
; )
(t; )
= 0: (13)
The rst term accounts for the negative marginal impact of job protection on employment. The second
term shows the marginal impact of job protection on the average probability of obtaining a lease. This
term must be positive to balance the employment e¤ect.
The second term is
t(t
; ) =  2PLT dPLT
dt
(LT   ST )| {z }
A<0
+ (1  P 2LT )
dH(1  =2 + PLT =2)
dt| {z }
B>0
+ P 2LT
dH(1  + PLT =2)
dt| {z }
C>0
:
It is composed of three e¤ects, A, B and C. According to A, increasing the cost of dismissal reduces
the pool of LT workers who benet from a better access to rentals. Therefore this e¤ect contributes
to reducing the average probability of having a lease. According to B and C, the increase in cost of
dismissal raises the probability of obtaining a rental for both ST and LT workers. This phenomenon is
due to composition e¤ects in both groups. The marginal workers who quit the group of LT workers have
the lowest belief on match quality in this group, but the largest one in the group of ST workers. Therefore
the mean expected risk of default decreases in both groups. These e¤ects explain why protecting jobs
may be interesting for nonemployed workers despite the negative impact of job protection on employment
opportunities.
HMR promotes the social demand for job protection. The value of screening increases with the
regulation parameter . In heavily regulated rental markets, young workers are in favor of a legislation
that reduces the supply of vacancies, increases unemployment and raises the proportion of ST employment
despite the legislation does not a¤ect the individual risk of job loss. The reason is HMR creates a need
for a technology helping landlords to screen heterogenous applicants on the basis of their ability to pay
the rent.
To conclude, the model equilibrium generically replicates the nexus of aggregate and micro facts
discussed in section 2. In particular, emancipation and employment are negatively correlated with HMR
as in Figures 1 and 2, the proportion of ST jobs increases with job protection as in Figure 3, and HMR
and job protection are positively correlated as in Figure 4. Meanwhile, as in Tables 1 and 2, HMR does
not directly a¤ect labor market outcomes and reduces youth emancipation, whereas job protection on
regular jobs reduces youth employment and increases the share of youth employees in temporary jobs.
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3.2 Extensions
In this section we study three extensions to the basic model. We start with the consideration of e¤ects of
job protection on individual dismissal as Decreuse and van Ypersele (2011). Therefore job protection both
increases selection into LT jobs and reduces the individual job loss probability. These two complementary
views of job destruction and job protection strengthen each other and contribute to increasing the demand
for job protection. We then consider the case where reducing worker mobility increases unemployment.
We focus on an extreme situation where occupying a job always involves moving to a new dwelling.
Despite rms take into account the e¤ect of the labor contract on the rental probability, selection into
employment is too low. Protecting LT jobs make rms more selective, which may improve employment
and emancipation. Lastly, we revisit the insider-outsider theory of job protection. We let the probability
of success P ex-ante di¤er in the population. We show two groups of workers prefer strongly protected
jobs: individuals with a large probability of success and those with a low probability of success. The
former want to belong to a small elite club with large access to the housing market, whereas the latter
want to be accompanied in short-term contracts by as many workers as possible to avoid stigmatization.
Job protection and the risk of dismissal. In the basic model, the individual risk of dismissal is not
a¤ected by EPL. The average risk of dismissal among LT workers decreases with job protection for
pure composition e¤ects as in Pries and Rogerson (2005) and Cahuc et al (2016). There is another
strand of literature based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) where employed workers are submitted to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks and job protection reduces the individual probability of dismissal. We
now account for both types of e¤ects, i.e., composition and individual e¤ects.
With probability 1   P the rm incurs an operative loss  , where  is drawn from the cdf G on
the support (0;1). Workers occupying a ST job are always dismissed in such a case, whereas workers
in a LT contract are dismissed when  > t. The threshold belief PLT solves PLT (yL   w) = PLT (yH  
w)   (1   PLT )f(t), where f(t) =  
R t
0
dG()   [1   G(t)]t. This gives PLT = f(t)=(y + f(t)). The
free-entry condition still implies
c =
m ()


y
1  PLT
2
+ (yL   w)1
2

;
whereas ST, LT and overall employment are
eLT =
m()
2
[1  P 2LT + (1  PLT )2G(t)];
eST =
m()
2
P 2LT ;
e =
m()
2

1 + (1  PLT )2G(t)

:
Like the basic model, the cost of dismissal distorts the allocation of ST and LT contracts. Therefore
this cost reduces the supply of vacancies and increases the share of ST contracts. However, now it also
reduces the individual job loss probability for workers with a LT contract. Therefore the overall e¤ect of
t on employment is ambiguous.
Landlords make their decision on the basis of the following average default probabilities: LT =
(1  PLT )[1 G(t)]=2 < 1=2 and ST = 1  PLT =2. The cost of dimissal still induces risk selection into
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ST and LT employment, which decreases both default probabilities. Moreover it further decreases the
average LT workersdefault probability by reducing the individual risk of dismissal.
The emancipation probability is
q =
m()
2

H(1  LT ) + P 2LT (H(1  ST ) H(1  LT )) +H(1  LT )(1  PLT )2G(t)
	
:
When  = 0, the emancipation probability is q = eH(1). Therefore the optimal cost of dismissal maxi-
mizes employment. When  = 1, people have two reasons to set job protection above the employment-
maximizer parameter. On the one hand, job protection improves screening like in the basic model. The
transmission of high-quality signals to landlords improves the access to rentals and makes emancipation
easier. On the other hand, the cost of dismissal reduces the individual default risk of workers in LT con-
tracts. This further increases their chance of obtaining a rental. This latter e¤ect is similar to Decreuse
and van Ypersele (2011) who study the impact of job protection on mortgage prices.
HMR increases the return to job security through two complementary e¤ects: improved screening
reduces the magnitude of landlordsasymmetric information problem and decreased individual risk of job
loss lowers the correlated risk of rent default.
HMR, employment and workersmobility. In the basic model, the only e¤ect of HMR on employment
is due to the correlated demand for job protection. This is in line with the micro evidence reported
in section 2, Table 1. However, Table A1 in the Appendix shows that HMR is negatively associated
to youth employment when we consider a di¤erent sample of individuals. We now follow Rupert and
Wasmer (2012) and introduce a direct e¤ect of HMR on employment due to its negative impact on worker
mobility. Accounting for this e¤ect modies the reasoning because, now, facilitating the access to rentals
can also increase employment. We show that EPL is still needed as a rm discipline device to make them
more selective and improve access to rentals.
To consider an extreme case, suppose that occupying a job requires moving from the family home to
an alternative location. Therefore employment and emancipation coincide. Once a worker is met, the
rm chooses the contract type accounting for the chance of having a rental. O¤ering a ST contract gives
P (yL   w)H(1  ST ), whereas o¤ering a LT contract gives P (yH   w)H(1  LT )  (1  P )t.
The free-entry condition implies
c =
m()

(Z PLT
0
H(1  ST )P (yL   w)dP +
Z 1
PLT
[H(1  LT )P (yH   w)  t(1  P )]dP
)
(14)
and the threshold belief is
PLT =
t
(yH   w)H(1  LT )  (yL   w)H(1  ST ) + t ; (15)
Firms take as given the group-specic mean default probability used by landlords to decide whether to
accept a potential tenant or not. However, such default probabilities depend on rmspolicies to o¤er
ST and LT contracts. In equilibrium the selection threshold solves the following xed-point problem:
PLT =
t
(yH   w)H(1  =2 + PLT =2)  (yL   w)H(1  + PLT =2) + t : (16)
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When  = 0, the probability of having a rental is equal to one for both groups of workers. Thus
PLT = t=(y+ t) as in the basic model. When  > 0, the right-hand side of equation (16) is a¤ected by
PLT in two opposite ways. Both mean default probabilities decrease with PLT , which implies that both
ST and LT workers are more likely to nd a rental. The negative impact of PLT on LT is a stabilizer
e¤ect: an increase in PLT raises LT workersprobability of obtaining a rental, which provides rms with
incentive to o¤er LT contracts. Conversely, the negative impact of PLT on ST is a multiplier e¤ect:
increasing PLT reduces rmsincentive to o¤er LT contracts.
Given the stabilizer and multiplier e¤ects depend on the density H 0 of the opportunity cost distrib-
ution, it is possible to conceive cases where the latter e¤ect dominates the former one. In other words,
there may be multiple equilibria. In high-selection equilibria, few workers are hired in LT contracts and
they easily nd rentals, whereas the large pool of workers hired in ST contracts benet from a moderate
access to rentals. In low-selection equilibria, more workers are hired in LT contracts and they face more
di¢ culties to nd dwellings than in high-selection equilibria. Moreover, the smaller number of workers
hired in ST contracts struggle to nd rentals.
In equilibrium, rms under-select workers in LT jobs. One way to see this consists in maximizing
rms expected prots with respect to PLT while accounting for its e¤ects on the signals received by
landlords. We obtain
PLT =
t
(yH   w)H(1  =2 + PLT =2)  (yL   w)H(1  + PLT =2) + t
 
dST
dPLT
h(1  ST )
R PLT
0
P (yL   w)dP + dLTdPLT
R 1
PLT
h(1  LT )P (yH   w)dP
(yH   w)H(1  =2 + PLT =2)  (yL   w)H(1  + PLT =2) + t
>
t
(yH   w)H(1  =2 + PLT =2)  (yL   w)H(1  + PLT =2) + t ;
because di=dPLT < 0 for i = ST;LT .
The rst line of the right-hand side corresponds to the hiring threshold that rms set in the decentral-
ized allocation. The second line accounts for the signal transmitted to landlords. Given PLT decreases
both group-specic rent default probabilities, the resulting threshold is larger than in equilibrium. The
situation is typical of the prisoners dilemma. It is in the collective interest of rms to restrict the sup-
ply of LT contracts so as to transmit high-quality signals to landlords. At private level, each rm has
incentive to deviate from this strategy to make sure that the worker will nd a rental and the job will
be occupied. In equilibrium rms o¤er too many LT contracts, operating prots are too low and too few
vacancies are supplied.
The optimal cost of dismissal still maximizes the emancipation probability, which is here equivalent
to maximizing employment. Like the basic model, HMR promotes job protection because rms are
insu¢ ciently selective. We illustrate this statement by confronting two extreme cases. In the absence of
HMR, landlords accept all potential tenants and the cost of dismissal reduces employment. Therefore
the optimal cost is t = 0. Conversely, when  = 1, having t = 0 implies that PLT = 0. Firms do not
select workers and the mean default probabilities are LT = 1=2 and ST = 0. Thus LT = ST = 0 and
employment and emancipation are equal to 0. Thus t > 0.
In this extended model, employment and emancipation coincide. Therefore optimal job protection
19
actually maximizes employment. In the more general case where only a share of job o¤ers require moving
to an alternative location, there is still a trade-o¤ between employment and access to rentals as in the
basic model.
Insider-outsider theory of job protection. Saint-Paul (2001) describes the insider-outsider theory of
labor market institutions. This theory posits that existing institutions maximize the well-being of the
majority of workers installed in LT jobs. In the basic model, we study the preferences of a typical
individual under the veil of ignorance. However, it is obvious that the ex-ante risks of losing future
jobs and defaulting on future rents di¤er in the youth population. We now consider the preferences of
heterogenous individuals in terms of such risks. This leads us to distinguish two groups of persons who
prefer strongly protected jobs: young workers with high and low risks of being dismissed.
Let ui = m(
)H(1  i)=2 be the normalized utility when the worker can obtain a type-i contract,
i = ST;LT . The utility U of a type-P worker depends on the belief threshold according to:
U =
(
PuLT (w   1) if P  PLT
PuST (w   1) if P > PLT
When  > 0, we have LT < ST . Therefore uLT > uST and all workers prefer LT contracts to benet
from better access to rentals. The function U jumps upward when the type P crosses the threshold PLT .
The variable PLT is monotonically increasing in t. Thus it is equivalent to analyze preferences vis-
à-vis t or PLT . We focus on PLT with t = PLT1 PLT y. For ease, we suppose that the functions uST and
uLT are single-peaked, taking their maximum in P
+
ST and P
+
LT , respectively. The corresponding costs of
dismissals are t+ST and t
+
LT , with t
+
ST =
P+ST
1 P+ST
y and t+LT =
P+LT
1 P+LT
y. Wheter P+ST is larger or lower
than P+LT depends on the monotonicity of the ratio h(x)=H(x) with respect to x.
Let P be the workers type such that the person is indi¤erent between t+ST and t
+
LT . Since H(1  
LT ) > H(1  ST ); this limit type is such that P < minfP+LT ; P+ST g.
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Figure 6: Preferred job protection when workers know their
type. The normalized utility functions uST and uLT ,
normalized utility maximizers P+ST and P
+
LT , and the limit type
P are dened in the text. The bold line shows the normalized
utility of a type P worker when PLT changes.
Figure 6 depicts the normalized utility functions uLT and uST when the threshold belief PLT varies.
Large-P individuals, i.e., with P  P+LT , prefer the level of job protection maximizing the normalized
utility associated to LT contracts. Such individuals are sure to become LT workers and incline for high
selection into this group, thereby ensuring that landlords are willing to o¤er them a rental. The level of
protection is only limited by its negative impact on job openings.
At the other bound of the type spectrum, low-P individuals, i.e., P  P , prefer the level of job
protection maximizing the normalized utility associated to ST contracts. This level can be substantially
large for reasons symmetric to large-P individuals. Low-P individuals are sure to become ST workers.
Therefore they want to be mixed with a pool of high types, which obtains when LT jobs are very selective.
Lastly, medium-P individuals, i.e., with P < P < P+LT , want to become LT workers. Therefore they
prefer the largest cost of dismissal that is compatible with their selection into the pool of LT workers,
which implies PLT = P .
Two conclusions can be drawn. First, large-P individuals and low-P individuals have similar interests
for job protection. Both want the entry into LT jobs to be selective so that the mean default probabilities
associated to their group are high. Second, the group of workers less attached to job protection is less
homogenous. Each worker of this group wants a LT contract, but also wants to exclude lower P individuals
belonging to the same group from LT jobs.
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Alternative risks and markets. Our arguments can actually be applied to alternative risks and mar-
kets. These risks must be correlated with the probability of long-term success in an employment relation-
ship, whereas the market situation must involve a screening problem taking place after the labor contract
choice. Consider rst another risk specic to the rental market: the risk of damage to the dwelling due to
tenants negligence. Workers who lose their jobs do not necessarily damage the dwelling as a reaction to
the job loss. However, the characteristics associated to being successful in a LT employment relationship
may be correlated with the characteristics associated to caring a home. In such a situation, the labor
contract vehicles a signal on the risk of damage. If housing regulation increases the loss incurred by the
landlord in case of damage, then the value of the labor contract signal increases with job protection.
The market for properties o¤ers a similar situation where the lender must assess the borrowers ability
to repay the debt. The costs of litigation vary a lot across countries and frequently amount to signicant
proportions of property values. Lenders typically use the labor contract to screen potential borrowers.
Here again, the value of this signal increases with the strictness of job protection. We do not insist on
this case because the youth do not have a large access to the market for properties.
The marriage market provides another example where job protection is particularly useful to screen
potential life partners. The divorce regulation increases the cost of divorce by reducing the utility obtained
by each divorcee. Thus marriage candidates must assess the risk of divorce prior to accepting marriage
proposals. The labor contract o¤ers a signal on ones ability to maintain a solid marriage. There is
evidence suggesting that the loss of a job increases the risk of marriage dissolution for purely informational
reasons and not for economic motives. Doiron and Mendolia (2011) study the rate of divorce following
an involuntary job loss. Redundancies have much smaller impacts than dismissals and ends of temporary
jobs. This is in line with the idea that the latter motives convey a signal on future earnings and marriage
quality. Charles and Stevens (2004) show there is an increase in the probability of divorce following a
spouses job displacement but no change in divorce probability after a spousal disability. As they explain,
this di¤erence casts doubt on a purely pecuniary motivation for divorce following earnings shocks, since
both types of shocks exhibit similar long-run economic consequences.
4 Conclusion
In many European countries, young workers are over-exposed to unemployment and job instability and
quit the family home remarkably late. Meanwhile long-term jobs are very protected and the rental market
is heavily regulated. Despite this situation calls for reforms of labor contracts, young workers are not
willing to reduce protection of long-term jobs they do not hold. This paper provides a rationale to the lack
of youth support for reforms of job protection. When the rental market is heavily regulated, protecting
long-term contracts provides a screening technology improving access to the housing market. The risks of
rent default and job dismissal are inherent to individuals and positively correlated. Employers who o¤er
a long-term contract transmit a signal to landlords about the workers type. The quality of this signal
increases with the strictness of job protection.
Our paper calls for reforms of the housing market. Ideally one would like to reduce the level of
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procedural formalism in case of disputes between landlords and tenants. However, it is hardly feasible
to modify it independently from the rest of the judicial system. Therefore the most important reform
consists of insuring landlords against the rent default. The cost of such insurance can be large in terms of
moral hazard e¤ects. A key benet consists of weakening the political support for job protection, thereby
opening the door to labor market reforms. In France, the recent launch of the Visale guarantee is a step
in this direction. This guarantee against rent default is accessible to all individuals below 30 who are not
in education3 and individuals above 30 in short-term employment. It covers all rents until the end of the
rental contract. Eligibility conditions are fairly weak: the rent cannot exceed 1500 euros per month in
Paris and 1300 euros elsewhere and the rent-to-income ratio cannot exceed 50%. Visale is nanced by
Action-Logement, an institutional body related to the State. Therefore it is free for renters and landlords
who plan to use it.
We focus on a particular set of regulations of the housing market, namely procedural formalism in
case of disputes between landlords and tenants. Housing market institutions are less well known and
measured than labor ones. There are other types of regulation that we abstract from and that may have
di¤erent e¤ects on the housing and labor markets as well as on the social demand for job protection. We
plan to study these alternative sets of regulation in future work.
3Students who do not depend on parentsincome and scholarship holders are also eligible.
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APPENDIX
We study the robustness of the econometric results presented in section 2. We rst reproduce Table
1 with a di¤erent sample including individuals in education. We then consider di¤erent age intervals
dening the youth population.
Table A1 reproduces columns a and c of Table 1 when the youth population includes all individuals
in education. Columns b and d are not reproduced because they are unchanged. Table A1 conrms the
results displayed by Table 1. On the one hand, labor market reforms do not a¤ect emancipation and the
access to rentals, whereas HMR strongly reduces rental opportunities. On the other hand, reforms of LT
contracts increase the youth employment probability. The e¤ect is quantitatively smaller than in Table
1, which is not surprising given many individuals in education do not stop schooling following a change
in labor market conditions. The main di¤erence with Table 1 is that HMR now reduces the employement
probability (column a). This nding helps to motivate the second extension we propose in section 4.
a b
dependent variable emp ema
reformLT 0.0452 0.0018
(3.50) (0.33)
reformST 0.0052 -0.0033
(0.73) (-0.70)
HMRt -0.0694 -0.0299
(-2.15) (-1.82)
HMRt 3 -0.0199 -0.1211
(-0.44) (-6.09)
within R2 0.078 0.098
N 214,532 214,884
Table A1: The impacts of EPL and HMR on youth employment and emancipation. Signicance
thresholds: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The t statistics are between parentheses. All regressions include
individual xed e¤ects, time e¤ects / age, and time-varying individual-specic controls (a dummy equal to one
when the individual is 16-25, another dummy equal to one when the individual is a woman and aged 16-25, and
the interaction of the latter variable with a country-specic dummy). Each observation is weighted using the
ECHP sampling weights. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level.
The panels of Figures A2 to A7 show the e¤ects of the age span on the key parameter estimates.
Each panel is associated to a specic dependent variable (emp, ltc, ema, rent), a particular denition
of the youth population (including individuals in education or not including them), and a particular
modication of the age interval (increasing lower bound or decreasing upper bound). Overall these
gures show that the general ndings reported in section 2 hold for these di¤erent subpopulations. In
particular, reforms of ST contracts are not correlated with employment and emancipation, reforms of
26
LT contracts are more correlated with employment than emancipation and HMR is more correlated with
emancipation than employment. To deep into details, Figure A2 shows that reforms of LT contracts are
more associated with the employment of younger workers, but Figures A6 suggest this is partly due to
selection in education. Figures A3 and A7 reveal that reforms of LT contracts may have heterogenous
e¤ects on the emancipation probability of the di¤erent age groups (positive for older workers and negative
for younger ones), though the overall e¤ect is nil.
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Figures A2: Estimated parameters of the employment regression for different age 
groups, case where individuals in education are excluded from the sample 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures A3: Estimated parameters of the emancipation regression for different age 
groups, case where individuals in education are excluded from the sample 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figures A4: Estimated parameters of the ltc regression for different age groups, 
case where individuals in education are excluded from the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures A5: Estimated parameters of the rent regression for different age groups, 
case where individuals in education are excluded from the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures A6: Estimated parameters of the employment regression for different age 
groups, case where individuals in education are in the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures A7: Estimated parameters of the emancipation regression for different age 
groups, case where individuals in education are  in the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
